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Abstract 
Non-discrimination it is considered a basic and general principle relating to the 
protection of human rights. International human rights system aims to protect against gender 
discrimination in two ways: through the principles of non-discrimination and equality in 
treaties that do not focus specifically on the enjoyment of women rights and through a 
women-specific human rights treaty. 
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Introduction 
Non-discrimination it is considered a basic and general principle relating to the 
protection of human rights. International human rights system aims to protect against gender 
discrimination in two ways: through the principles of non-discrimination and equality in 
treaties that do not focus specifically on the enjoyment of women rights and through a 
women-specific human rights treaty.  
This article aims to present the main international provisions on prohibition of 
discrimination, especially gender discrimination.In acest articol nu se vor prezenta 
prevederile de la nivelul UE. This article will not present EU provisions. 
 
1. The definition of discrimination  
The Human Rights Committee consider that “non-discrimination, together with 
equality before the law and equal protection of the law without any discrimination, constitute 
a basic and general principle relating to the protection of human rights.”1 
Neither the Universal Declaration of Human Rights nor the International Covenants 
define “discrimination”. A definition of this term can only be found in conventions and 
declarations dealing with specific types or forms of discrimination. Article 1 of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women defines 
discrimination against women as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis 
of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and 
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, 
civil or any other field”. 
Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
defines racial discrimination as “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on 
race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying 
                                               
1Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18, para. 1. 
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or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on the equal footing, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public 
life”. 
The Human Rights Committee stated “that the term ‘discrimination’ as used in the 
Covenant should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference 
which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or 
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an 
equal footing, of all rights and freedoms”.2 But “the enjoyment of rights and freedoms on an 
equal footing does not mean identical treatment in every instance”. 3 
The European Court of Human Rights consider article 14 is violated “when States 
treat differently persons in analogous situations without providing an objective and reasonable 
justification”, it now also considers “that this is not the only facet of the prohibition of 
discrimination in Article 14” and that “the right not to be discriminated against in the 
enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention is also violated when States without 
objective and reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are 
significantly different.”4 
2. Legal provisions 
2.1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), (UDHR) 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted and proclaimed by UN 
General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948.  
Although intended as a non-binding declaration, it is often cited in cases before both 
national and international tribunals. 5 Some autors 6consider the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights has acquired the status of universally recognized norms of customary 
international law that bind all Member States of the United Nations. 
The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “recognition of 
the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” 
Provisions relevant to equality and non-discrimination are those of articles 1, 2 and 7.  
Article 1 of the Universal Declaration proclaims that “all human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights”, while, according to article 2: “everyone is entitled to all the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,property, 
birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, 
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, 
whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of 
sovereignty.” 
So according to article 2 of the Declaration “distinctions of any kind” are prohibited. 
This could be read as meaning that no differences can be legally tolerated. 
With regard to the right to equality, article 7 of the Universal Declaration stipulates 
that: “all are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal 
protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in 
violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.” 
                                               
2 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18, para. 7. 
3 Ibid., para. 8. 
4 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Thlimmenos v. Greece, judgment of 6 April 2000, para. 44. 
5 Kitching, K. (ed.), Non-Discrimination in International Law. A handbook for practitioners, Interights 
Publishing House, London, 2005, p. 28. 
6 Alston, P., Steiner, H. (eds.), International Human Rights in Context, Clarendon Press Publishing House, 
Oxford, 1996, p. 143. 
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Article 2 and 7 applies only to the rights and freedoms set forth in Declaration. These 
are considered a dependent provision as it guarantees non-discrimination with respect only to 
the rights guaranteed by the ICCPR.7 
2.2 European Convention on Human Rights (1950), (ECHR) 
The European Convention on Human Rights was adopted by the Council of Europe in 
1950 and entered into force in 1953. 
Article 14 states: “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status.” 
Article 1 is the central provision of the ECHR concerning equality. It can be 
interpreted as an open-ended prohibition of discrimination because of the use of the words 
“other status”.  
The protection it gives is dependent in that it only covers “ the rights and freedoms set 
forth in Convention”. In the case of Rasmussen v. Denmark, the European Court of Human 
Rights 8 states that “Article 14 complements the other substantive provisions of the 
Convention and the Protocols. It has no independent existence since it has effect solely in 
relation to "the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms" safeguarded by those provisions. 
Although the application of Article 14 does not necessarily presuppose a breach of those 
provisions - and to this extent it has autonomous meaning - there can be no room for its 
application unless the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one or more of the latter. ” 
According to European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence9, discrimination for the 
purposes of Article 14 occurs where: there is different treatment of persons in analogous or 
relevantly similar situations; and that difference in treatment has no “objective and reasonable 
justification.” An objective and reasonable justification is established if the measure in 
question has a legitimate aim and there is “a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized”. 
In Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom the court acknowledged that “where a general 
policy or measure has disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group, it is not 
excluded that this may be considered as discriminatory notwithstanding that it is not 
specifically aimed or directed at that group”. 10 In D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic the 
Court expressly named a discriminatory act as indirect discrimination. Therefore, the 
European Convention on Human Rights provides protection to bort direct adn indirect 
discrimination. 
In 4 November 2000 was adopted Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention, which 
expands the scope of the prohibition of discrimination. The Protocol contains a general 
prohibition of discrimination. Article 1(1) provides that “the enjoyment of any right set forth 
by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status”. Article 1(2) states that “no one shall be 
discriminated against by any public authority on any ground such as those mentioned in 
paragraph 1”. The Protocol is into force but not all member states ratified it. 
Some autors goes even further in stating that, “the equality right arises even if the right 
has not been specially granted, but inferred from a duty imposed upon a public authority. For 
                                               
7 Kitching, K. (ed.), Non-Discrimination in International Law. A handbook for practitioners, Interights 
Publishing House, London, 2005, p. 31. 
8 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Rasmussen v. Denmark, judgment of 28 November1994, para. 29. 
9 European Court of Human Rights, Case "relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in 
education in Belgium" v. Belgium, judgment of 23 July 1968, para. 10. 
10 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, final judgment of 4 August 
2001, para. 154. 
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example, the statutory duty to provide education for school-age children, or to house 
unintentional homeless, while not necessary creating rights in individuals, would attract the 
duty not to discriminate.” 11 
It is clear from the wording of this article that it is an independent provision 
prohibiting discrimination in the enjoyment of any right or benefit under national law. 
 
2.3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), (ICCPR) 
The UN General Assembly adopted the ICCPR in 1966, which entered into force in 
1976. 
The right to equality and freedom from discrimination is protected by various 
provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
In article 2(1) each State party: “undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”  
Article 26 states that “all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any 
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against 
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Article 26 it is considered 
the cornerstone of protection against discrimination under this Covenant. 
These articles does not enumerate all of the grounds of discrimination and include a 
general provision “or other status”. 12 
Article 2(1) provides protection only in connection with the rights recognized in the 
Covenant. This is considered a dependent provision as it guarantees non-discrimination with 
respect only to the rights guaranteed by the ICCPR.13 Contrary to article 2(1), article 26 in an 
autonomous right of equality and “prohibits discrimination in law or in fact in any field 
regulated and protected by public authorities”. So the rights granted by legislation must be 
provided without discrimination.  
Gender equality is emphasized in article 3, according to which States parties 
“undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and 
political rights set forth in the present Covenant”. 
Article 14 provides that “all persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals”. 
Human Rights Committee states that “purpose and effect” 14 of any measure must 
comply with the Covenant. 15This suggests that direct and indirect discrimination are 
prohibided. Human Rights Committee emphasis and “the principle of equality sometimes 
requires States parties to take affirmative action in order to diminish or eliminate conditions 
which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited by the Covenant”.16  
 
2.4 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), 
(ICESCR) 
 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was adopted the 
in 1966 and entered into force in 1976. 
                                               
11 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law, Oxford University Press Publishing House, Oxford, 2001, p. 52. 
12 Is an “open ended” provision. 
13 Kitching, K.(ed.), Non-Discrimination in International Law. A handbook for practitioners, Interights 
Publishing House, London, 2005, p. 31. 
14 This could be interpreted as prohibiting direct discrimination (“purpose”) and indirect discrimination (“effect”) 
15 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18, para. 7. 
16 Ibid., para. 10. 
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 Under article 2(2) the States parties undertake “to guarantee that the rights enunciated 
in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status”. The States also undertake under article 3 “to ensure the equal right of 
men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the 
present Covenant”. 
The provisions of the ICESCR (Articles 2(2) and 3) are similar to Articles 2(1) and 3 
of the ICCPR and were intended in the relevant parts to have the same meaning. There is no 
equivalent of Article 26 in the ICESCR.  
Article 2(2) it is considered a dependent provision as it guarantees “the rights 
enunciated in the present Covenant”. This article contains a nonexhaustive list of grounds 
protected, so it is an “open ended” provision. CESCR states that Article 2(2) prohibits direct 
and indirect discrimination.17 The states are required to ensure formal and substantive 
equality, which means that they are permitted to take positive action and may be required to 
do so in order to prevent discrimination. 18 
Gender equality is contained in article 7(a) (i), which guarantees “fair wages and equal 
remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women 
being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for 
equal work”.  
Lastly, article 7(c) of the Covenant secures the right to “equal opportunity for 
everyone to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate higher level, subject to no 
considerations other than those of seniority and competence”. 
 
2.5 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (1979), (CEDAW) 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
was adopted in 1979 and entered into force in 1981. 
Article 1 of the Convention defines discrimination against women as “any distinction, 
exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing 
or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital 
status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field”. 
Protection against discrimination in CEDAW is limited to discrimination against 
women. Article 1(1) refers to only one ground of discrimination, namely sex discrimination. 
Article 1(1) autonomous right of equality and prohibits “any distinction, exclusion or 
restriction made on the basis of sex”.This article does not enumerate all of the grounds of 
discrimination and include a general provision “or other field”. Article 1(1) is similar to 
Articles 2(1) of the ICCPR and Article 2(2) of the ICESCR, thus this article could be 
interpreting in the same way as the other two articles in that prohibit both direct and indirect 
discrimination. 
The achievement of equality not only de jure but also de facto demands sometimes 
that an affirmative action be taken by States to diminish or eliminate conditions which cause 
discrimination of individuals or groups of the population. Article 4(1) states that the adoption 
by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality 
between men and women shall not be considered as discriminatory.  
Eleanor Roosevelt pointed out specialisation of certain issues or rights may lead to 
marginalisation and stigmatisation of women. But proponents of the this approach argue that 
                                               
17 Committe on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General comment no. 20, para. 10. 
18 Kitching, K.(ed.), Non-Discrimination in International Law. A handbook for practitioners, Interights 
Publishing House, London, 2011, p. 29. 
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the risk of addressing women’s rights only in a mainstream human rights framework may 
result in these matters being completely ignored or overlooked. 19 
The adoption of the CEDAW meant that women’s rights were expressly placed in the 
ambit of international human rights, but the rights of women were still ignored by the 
mainstream human rights mechanisms. One problem after CEDAW is that the monitoring 
bodies of the other human rights treaties do not solve violations of women’s rights and leave 
these issues up to the specialised CEDAW Committee to deal with and the adoption of the 
CEDAW has therefore led to the marginalisation of human rights of women. So the criticism 
is that the mainstream human rights instruments do not pay attention to women’s rights. 20 
 
Conclusions 
Much has been achieved in the past six decades to prohibit and eliminate gender 
discrimination.  
Discrimination is a dependent provision and the prohibition is linked to the enjoyment 
of another rights. In discrimination cases no claim can be made only in conjunction with one 
of the specified rights. This limitation is softened by the fact that there is not necessary to 
show a breach of one of the substantive rights. In other words, claims brought to justice must 
relate to discrimination in the enjoyment of another right, and discrimination cannot be 
invoked on its own, only “in conjunction with” substantive rights and there does not need to 
be a violation of the substantive right itself for discrimination rules to be applicable. This 
provision differs from the other human right.  
International regulation are applicable men and women without discrimination, but the 
exclusions specific to are neither recognised nor protected by mainstream human rights 
instruments. 
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